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Loan Sharks, Interest-Rate Caps, 
and Deregulation 
Robert Mayer* 
Abstract 
The specter of the loan shark is often conjured by advocates of 
price deregulation in the market for payday loans. If binding price 
caps are imposed, the argument goes, loan sharks will be 
spawned. This is the loan-shark thesis. This Article tests that 
thesis against the historical record of payday lending in the 
United States since the origins of the quick-cash business around 
the Civil War. Two different types of creditors have been derided 
as “loan sharks” since the epithet was first coined. One used 
threats of violence to collect its debts but the other did not. The 
former has been less common than the latter. In the United States, 
the violent loan sharks proliferated in the small-loan market after 
state usury caps were raised considerably and these loan sharks 
dwindled away as a source of credit for working people before 
interest-rate deregulation began to be adopted at the end of the 
1970s. The other type of loan shark thrived both when usury 
ceilings were very low and when they were very high or even 
removed. Deregulation does not starve the nonviolent species of 
loan shark into extinction but instead feeds it. Hence the loan-
shark thesis is seriously flawed. It does not accord well with the 
historical record of the market for payday loans. 
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I. Introduction 
Defenders of expensive, subprime credit products like payday 
loans often claim that imposing interest-rate caps on consumer 
credit will bring back the loan sharks that were said to have been 
starved into extinction by the policy of financial deregulation. 
This is the loan-shark thesis. The thesis is often asserted in 
passing by advocates of interest-rate deregulation,1 but it has 
recently been defended in detail in an article published in 
Banking Law Journal entitled “History Repeats Itself: Why 
Interest Rate Caps Pave the Way for the Return of the Loan 
                                                                                                     
 1. See Todd Zywicki, Consumer Use and Government Regulation of Title 
Pledge Lending, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 425, 457 (2010) (“The flexibility and 
deregulation of consumer credit markets in the United States has substantially 
reduced the importance of illegal loan-shark lending.” (citation omitted)). 
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Sharks.”2 According to its authors, Justice David Baker and 
MacKenzie Breitenstein, “it is possible if interest-rate caps are 
again used as a primary means of regulating consumer credit 
that the loan-shark industry will return to prominence as 
regulated lenders will quit lending to high risk borrowers.”3 This 
is said to be the perverse consequence of trying to regulate the 
price of consumer credit. Outlawing high prices spawns loan 
sharks, who are the worst sort of creditors. They beat or kill 
debtors who are late with their payments. Rate caps, we are told, 
unintentionally drive credit-constrained consumers into their 
clutches because price ceilings ration legal credit away from the 
least-advantaged and riskiest applicants. According to Baker and 
Breitenstein, the history of credit regulation in the United States 
teaches us this lesson.4 
But in this Article I will show that, depending on how we 
define “loan shark,” this intuitively plausible thesis is either false 
and indeed exactly wrong, or too simple and thus misleading. 
Historically, there have been two distinct types of creditors that 
were derided as loan sharks, one using threats of violence to 
collect its debts but the other not. The former has been less 
common than the latter. In the United States, the violent loan 
sharks proliferated in the small-loan market after state usury 
caps were raised considerably and these loan sharks dwindled 
away as a source of credit for working people before interest-rate 
deregulation began to be adopted at the end of the 1970s. The 
other type of loan shark thrived both when usury ceilings were 
very low and when they were very high or even removed. 
Deregulation, we must realize, does not starve the nonviolent 
species of loan shark into extinction but instead feeds it. That is 
the perverse consequence of removing the cap on interest rates in 
the market for small loans. 
Once we adopt a more nuanced view of what a loan shark is, 
it becomes clear that no policy can eliminate this type of creditor 
once and for all. There will always be loan sharks of one sort or 
                                                                                                     
 2. See generally Justice David Baker & MacKenzie Breitenstein, History 
Repeats Itself: Why Interest Rate Caps Pave the Way for the Return of the Loan 
Sharks, 127 BANKING L.J. 581 (2010). 
 3. Id. at 594. 
 4. See id. at 598 (referring to “the disastrous, unintended consequences 
created by interest rate regulations”). 
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another. The aim of public policy ought to be to minimize both 
varieties and not just the violent species. The regulatory strategy 
that best achieves this goal is the moderate price cap, neither too 
low nor too high (let alone rescinded). What history teaches us is 
that an interest rate capped between the extremes in the small-
loan market has reduced the total loan-shark population more 
effectively than the policy of interest-rate deregulation favored by 
those who subscribe to the loan-shark thesis. While it is true that 
excessively low interest-rate caps do have perverse consequences 
for the population this policy is meant to protect, we have to 
recognize that interest-rate deregulation also has perverse 
consequences because it spawns at least as many loan sharks as 
financial repression. The history of payday lending since its 
origins at the end of the nineteenth century illustrates this 
double-sided perversity of interest-rate regulation.5 
II. What Is a Loan Shark? 
As Ronald Goldstock and Dan Coenen observe, “The term 
‘loanshark’ lacks a precise definition; neither linguists nor 
lawyers have concentrated on the term.”6 They also correctly note 
that “differing generations have assigned the term differing 
connotations.”7  
The epithet loan shark is an Americanism and emerged in 
popular discourse late in the nineteenth century.8 It is one of a 
family of slang metaphors that likens some object of opprobrium 
to the predatory behavior of the shark (“card shark,” “land 
shark,” “money shark,” “legal shark”). Though any sharp lender 
may be described disparagingly as a loan shark, from the 
beginning this particular phrase was associated with a set of 
expensive small-loan products that had come into existence 
around the Civil War, in particular the chattel mortgage and the 
salary loan. The chattel-mortgage lender advanced cash on the 
                                                                                                     
 5. See generally ROBERT MAYER, QUICK CASH: THE STORY OF THE LOAN 
SHARK (2010) (recounting the history of loan-sharking). 
 6. RONALD GOLDSTOCK & DAN COENEN, EXTORTIONATE AND USURIOUS 
CREDIT TRANSACTIONS: BACKGROUND MATERIALS 1 (1978) (citation omitted). 
 7. Id. at 2 (citation omitted). 
 8. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 3–4, 13–14. 
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security of a debtor’s furniture or household possessions, while 
the salary lender or salary broker took a wage assignment to 
ensure repayment.9 The latter product was the original payday 
loan, tied as it was to the debtor’s payment cycle, but in the 
popular press of the day these vendors of what was typically an 
unamortized cash advance were regularly labeled as loan sharks. 
The anathema was applied not narrowly, to the exceptionally 
unscrupulous lender, but broadly, to the industry as a whole. 
Lending in this fashion, at high rates and on the security of a 
wage assignment, was widely viewed as predatory behavior. 
A. Original Intent 
What was thought to be predatory or shark-like about the 
salary loan, however, was not the use or threat of violence to 
collect the debt. Salary lenders did not beat or kill borrowers who 
defaulted on their loans.10 These creditors also did not have ties 
to organized crime families, which scarcely existed at this time.11 
The collection methods of the first loan sharks were certainly 
aggressive, but in contemporary accounts one almost never reads 
about acts of brute force. To compel repayment, salary lenders 
pestered debtors incessantly at home, or sent “bawlers-out” to 
make a scene at work, or processed wage assignments, or used 
the powers of attorney they had taken to confess judgment before 
justices of the peace.12 They did not have to lay a hand on 
customers in arrears to do a profitable business. Indeed, many 
firms had a preference for hiring women as loan agents because, 
as one news story explained, “they give an appearance of 
harmlessness to the lending establishment, and an outraged 
borrower is not so anxious to kick the manager out of a window if 
                                                                                                     
 9. See LOUIS ROBINSON & ROLF NUGENT, REGULATION OF THE SMALL LOAN 
BUSINESS 35–36 (1935). 
 10. See Mark Haller & John Alviti, Loan-sharking in American Cities: 
Historical Analysis of a Marginal Enterprise, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 125, 125 
(1977) (“There is no evidence that these loansharks used violence for collection 
of debts.”). 
 11. See id. (“Such loansharks, so far as can be determined, had no 
connection with gambling syndicates or other ‘organized crime’ activities.”). 
 12. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 38–41. 
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she is a woman.”13 The salary-lending businesses were not 
thuggish, even though the vast majority operated in defiance of 
the applicable usury statute. 
The “bite” in the salary-loan transaction that provoked the 
loan shark epithet came not at the end, when the debt was 
collected, but at the beginning and referred to the peculiar 
structure of this credit product, which took the form of a trap. 
According to Neifeld’s Manual on Consumer Credit, published in 
1961, “[t]he essence of loan shark deals is small amounts for short 
terms, with an effort to keep the principal out all the time to 
secure repeated renewals of the interest charge.”14 It was lending 
in this fashion, to prolong the interest payments and to ensnare 
borrowers in debt, that qualified a creditor as a loan shark in the 
original sense of the phrase: “Loan shark evils appear where the 
method of lending requires the entire indebtedness of the wage 
earner to mature at one time. Inability to pay anything but the 
interest on the loan almost inevitably results from this method of 
lending money.”15  
Neifeld’s Manual on Consumer Credit appeared at the 
beginning of a decade in which the idea of what a loan shark is 
was about to change and acquire its more modern connotation, 
but the manual merely summed up the widely held view that had 
crystallized over the previous half-century. “The real aim of loan 
sharks,” explained Avon Books’ How and Where to Borrow Money, 
“is to keep their customers eternally in debt so that interest (for 
the sharks) becomes almost an annuity.”16 A scholarly study on 
The Small-Loan Industry in Texas, published in 1960, noted that, 
while the loan shark always charges a high rate of interest, “he 
does more than this. He loans for . . . too short a period of 
time . . . making the payments too high, and . . . encouraging 
renewals or refinancing.”17 “This insistence upon planned, orderly 
liquidation of the loan is one of the hallmarks of the honest 
lender,” reported an earlier scholarly article.18 “The unlicensed 
                                                                                                     
 13. See Staff, Loan Shark Hires Women to Weave Web About Him, CHI. 
TRIB., Feb. 7, 1912, at 1, 7. 
 14. M.R. NEIFELD, NEIFELD’S MANUAL ON CONSUMER CREDIT 389 (1961). 
 15. Id. at 387–88. 
 16. IRA COBLEIGH, HOW AND WHERE TO BORROW MONEY 109 (1964). 
 17. DONALD TYREE, THE SMALL-LOAN INDUSTRY IN TEXAS 59 (1960). 
 18. Charles Gates, The Social Worker in the Service of the Small Loan 
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loan shark, on the other hand, seldom wants his principal so long 
as he gets his interest.”19 Even as late as 1982, after the 
associations of the loan shark had already begun to change, 
Playboy Paperbacks’ The Complete Guide to Credit and Loans 
could still say “the major feature [in this type of credit 
transaction] is that the loan shark is more concerned in collecting 
the interest than the principal.”20 Violent debt collection was not 
identified as a necessary element, let alone the defining trait, of 
the loan-shark deal. 
B. A Second Sense 
But the word association of the loan shark epithet changed 
quickly during the 1960s. Exposés of mob lending operations 
captured the headlines in cities like Chicago and New York and 
helped to redefine this opprobrium.21 The emphasis shifted to the 
method of debt collection, which was depicted as extortionate. A 
loan shark came to be understood as a black-market creditor with 
ties to organized crime who employed violence, or threats of 
violence, to compel repayment of a debt. In 1968, Congress 
enacted the Consumer Credit Protection Act,22 the second title of 
which proscribed “Extortionate Credit Transactions.”23 Though 
the phrase loan shark did not figure in the legislation itself, 
popular and legal commentary equated the extortionate credit 
transaction with loan-sharking, thereby shifting the emphasis in 
the concept to the back end of the exchange.24 How repayment of 
a debt is compelled became the defining trait of the loan-shark 
transaction. The idea now implied violence. This new 
understanding increasingly supplanted the original conception, 
                                                                                                     
Business, 196 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL 
SCIENCE 221, 223 (1938). 
 19. Id. 
 20. GERALD GIBBS, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO CREDIT AND LOANS 65 (1982). 
 21. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 105 (discussing several newspaper articles 
related to mob lending). 
 22. Consumer Credit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 
(1968). 
 23. Id. §§ 891–896. 
 24. See, e.g., N.Y. COMM’N OF INVESTIGATION, AN INVESTIGATION OF THE 
LOAN-SHARK RACKET (1965). 
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which emphasized the cost of the debt and the trap-like nature of 
the repayment plan. If “loan-sharking” is made synonymous with 
the extortionate credit transaction, then ironically the turn-of-
the-century salary lenders, for whom the epithet had been 
invented, could no longer be classified as loan sharks. 
Court opinions over the course of the twentieth century 
nicely registered this transformation in the image of the loan 
shark. In People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Wheeler,25 one of the 
first opinions to employ this colloquialism, the Illinois Supreme 
Court explained that “the ‘loan shark’ business, so-called, . . . is 
said to consist in the loaning of small amounts of money to clerks 
and other salaried employés, and to other persons, on chattel 
mortgages covering household goods, etc., at usurious rates of 
interest, from 10 per cent. upwards a month.”26 Here the 
clientele, the nature of the loan product, and the cost are 
emphasized; there is no mention of violence. Fast-forward forty 
years and the same idea is still being expressed by the Supreme 
Court of Kansas in State ex rel. Fatzer v. Molitor27:  
defendants engaged in what was commonly known as the “loan 
shark business,” the principal object of which was to collect 
and exact usurious rates of interest from laboring people, wage 
earners and others of small means who are forced by 
necessitous circumstances, such as sickness and other 
emergencies which placed them in critical situations, 
necessitating their obtaining funds to borrow small sums of 
money.28  
Another ten years elapses before the first association of the 
phrase with violence is recorded, in Macari v. N.Y. Mid-Hudson 
Trans-Corp.,29 issued by the Supreme Court of New York: “[T]he 
deceased was deeply indebted to ‘loan sharks’ and was fearful of 
his safety.”30  
                                                                                                     
 25. People ex rel. Chi. Bar Ass’n v. Wheeler, 102 N.E. 188 (Ill. 1913). 
 26. Id. at 188. 
 27. State ex rel. Fatzer v. Molitor, 263 P.2d 207 (Kan. 1953). 
 28. Id. at 208. 
 29. Macari v. N.Y. Mid-Hudson Trans-Corp., 19 A.D.2d 671 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1963). 
 30. Id. at 671. 
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C. The Common Denominator 
What this quick history of an Americanism demonstrates is 
that the loan shark has been not one breed but two. One variety 
uses violence to collect its debts but the other does not. The bite of 
this other loan shark, which appeared first on the scene, consists 
in the steep price it charges for its cash advances and in the debt 
trap that its product becomes for many consumers because the 
cost is high and the repayment period short. This original loan 
shark was fundamentally a debt trapper; the creditor vended an 
ostensibly short-term product that was “so designed as to 
handicap repayment.”31 We identify this loan shark by the 
volume of expensive renewals it authorizes and by the duration of 
its nominally short-term debts.  
In fact, the other type of loan shark, the one that uses force 
against debtors in default, has tended to engage in the same sort 
of behavior as the first. It is a debt trapper too. Many mob loans 
have been unamortized and interest-only (or “vigorish”), thus 
requiring a lump-sum payment at the end to retire the debt.32 
This lender, like the other, wants the borrower to extend the debt 
continuously because the steep interest payments are lucrative 
and because it can be both costly and risky to switch clients 
frequently.33 As one mob-connected loan shark catering to factory 
workers in the 1960s explained, “I don’t care when you pay back 
the principal . . . . Just keep up the interest payments every 
payday, that’s all.”34 This is the business model of every bona fide 
loan shark, violent or not. 
Certain kinds of lenders, catering to certain kinds of 
customers and operating in certain kinds of conditions, have had 
to employ violence to make the business model of debt trapping 
                                                                                                     
 31. FINDLEY WEAVER, OKLAHOMA’S SMALL LOAN PROBLEM 21 (1938). 
 32. See PETER REUTER & JONATHAN RUBINSTEIN, ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN NEW 
YORK: A CASE STUDY IN THE OPERATION, STRUCTURE, AND REGULATION OF AN 
ILLEGAL MARKET 173–74 (1982) (distinguishing between “knockdown,” or 
installment loans, and lump-sum “vig” loans). 
 33. See Loan-Sharking: The Untouched Domain of Organized Crime, 5 
COL. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 91, 95–96 (1969) (“A loan shark never wants his 
loan paid back.” (quoting interview with Gerard T. McGuire, Special U.S. 
Attorney, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Strike Force, in N.Y.C. (Oct. 31, 1968))). 
 34. The Confessions of a 6-For-5 “Juice Man,” 49 BURROUGHS CLEARING 
HOUSE 40, 40 (1965). 
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financially profitable. But other kinds of lenders, like the salary 
brokers a hundred years ago, did not. Their debt trapping was 
nonviolent. A regulatory policy that intends to attack loan-
sharking ought to address both forms of the phenomenon and not 
only the violent breed. The violent loan sharks have always been 
less common than the nonviolent ones and the predations of the 
latter are thus typically more widespread. The two stand in a 
complicated relationship to one another, as we shall see. 
Strategies that reduce one population may increase the other. 
Hence fighting each breed in isolation can be counterproductive. 
The history of interest-rate caps confirms this observation. When 
they are too low or too high, debt trapping in one form or the 
other has proliferated.  
III. Low Caps and No Caps 
The development of consumptive lending in Great Britain 
and the United States late in the nineteenth century illustrates 
what happens when interest-rate regulation veers toward one 
extreme or the other. In both countries, loan-sharking of the 
nonviolent sort spread widely in urban areas. In the United 
States, interest-rate caps were very low; in Great Britain, there 
was no cap at all. 
A. American Loan Sharks 
Until the late 1970s, regulation of the interest rates lenders 
could charge was entirely decentralized in the United States. 
Each state government established its own policy.35 During the 
nineteenth century, a few states deregulated interest rates, at 
least briefly, but the great majority imposed an annual 
percentage rate cap between 6% and 12%.36 As a rule, newer 
states permitted higher charges to attract lending capital for 
                                                                                                     
 35. See J.B.C. MURRAY, THE HISTORY OF USURY 70–91 (1866) (recounting 
the history of interest-rate regulation in each of the states through the Civil 
War). 
 36. See George Holmes, Usury in Law, in Practice and in Psychology, 7 
POL. SCI. Q. 431, 431–33 (1892) (discussing the rate caps imposed by the states). 
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development.37 The ceiling applied to every loan transaction 
within the jurisdiction, except where pawnbroking was licensed.38 
Usury before the twentieth century was rarely classified as a 
criminal offense. When proven, lenders forfeited the remaining 
interest specified by the contract, and sometimes the principal as 
well, but they were not sent to jail.39  
Despite the existence of such low caps since colonial days, 
loan-sharking did not emerge in the United States until 
sometime around the Civil War.40 Its precondition has always 
been a large mass of urban workers, white- and blue-collar, 
earning modest but steady pay.  
Loan-sharking isn’t feasible in a population that ekes out a 
bare subsistence. It also isn’t feasible if the debtors lack a 
steady income stream. Only people with recurring paydays can 
get payday loans. The phenomenon of payday is a product of 
the industrial revolution and its routinization of wage-labor. 
Factory-hands and office workers became employees—people 
whose services were engaged on a more or less continuous 
basis and who were paid not at the end of the harvest but 
every week or month.41  
As David Caplovitz observes, “the bureaucratization of the world 
of work is a structural prerequisite for the credit society.”42 Loan 
sharks were present at the birth of our credit society and they 
were spawned in the income stream of a swelling mass of wage-
workers who lived from payday to payday. 
Chattel-mortgage and salary-loan sharks proliferated at the 
end of the nineteenth century because the small, short-term loans 
                                                                                                     
 37. See Edward Glaeser & Jose Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower nor a 
Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41 
J.L. & ECON. 1, 13 (1998) (“In general, usury-rate ceilings rise with distance 
from the Atlantic Ocean.”). 
 38. See JOHN CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, 
PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 20 (1994) (describing the higher interest rates 
pawnbrokers were allowed to charge). 
 39. See Holmes, supra note 36, at 433–35 (classifying the penalties for 
usury in each state). 
 40. See ROBINSON & NUGENT, supra note 9, at 35–45 (recounting the history 
of small-loan products in the United States). 
 41. MAYER, supra note 5, at 15. 
 42. David Caplovitz, Consumer Credit in the Affluent Society, in CONSUMER 
CREDIT REFORM 3, 5 (Clark Havighurst ed., 1970). 
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working people needed to get them to the next payday could not 
be made profitably when the interest rate on credit was capped at 
such a low level. A typical salary loan of $20 due in one month at 
a rate of 7% a year would only earn the lender about a dime—
hardly enough to cover the expenses of an office, processing the 
loan application, debt collection, and default.43 Any lender who 
tried to make a business of catering to the swelling demand for 
payday loans at that time would have had to charge substantially 
more than the law permitted. By the start of the twentieth 
century, the going rate for unamortized salary loans was 20% a 
month or 240% a year.44 That’s cheaper than the typical payday 
loan today but it was twenty times the rate permitted a hundred 
years ago in states with the highest caps. Despite the expense, 
demand for these tiny bridge loans was great. At the height of the 
market, in the second decade of the twentieth century, reformers 
estimated that something like one-quarter of all urban wage 
earners borrowed from loan sharks in any given year.45 
The cost of the salary-loan product was inflated by the 
grayness of the market, which increased the lenders’ risk, by 
collusion among the lenders, and by the ignorance of borrowers 
and their failure to shop widely for credit. Competition in this 
market was very imperfect.46 But high cost by itself is not the 
hallmark of loan-sharking. Short-term loans will always be 
relatively expensive. The distinctive feature of loan-sharking, as 
noted in the previous Part, is the debt trap into which many 
borrowers are enticed by the either/or structure of these 
unamortized cash advances: either pay off the debt in one lump 
sum this payday or extend the due date another cycle for an 
additional, expensive fee. If you borrowed $20 last payday, you 
could pay $24 today and clear the debt or roll over the principal 
another cycle for an additional $4 charge. Inevitably, given the 
                                                                                                     
 43. See CLARENCE WASSAM, THE SALARY LOAN BUSINESS IN NEW YORK CITY 
24 (1908) (describing average transactions).  
 44. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 36 (reporting standard interest rates for a 
salary loan). 
 45. See CLARENCE HODSON, MONEY-LENDERS, LICENSE LAWS AND THE 
BUSINESS OF MAKING SMALL LOANS 13 (1919). 
 46. See Clyde Phelps, Monopolistic and Imperfect Competition in Consumer 
Loans, 8 J. MARKETING 382, 382 (1944) (distinguishing between the market for 
commercial loans and consumer personal installment loans). 
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cash-strapped clientele to which the salary lenders catered, many 
debtors opted for the smaller payment. A new financial 
emergency might compel them to borrow from a different salary 
lender, using the proceeds of this new transaction to pay the fee 
for the old one. Late charges were added to the principal, which 
meant the fee would rise too. Frantic borrowers built pyramids of 
debt from a single, small cash advance. One survey from the 
period reported that 40% of these ostensibly short-term loans 
were extended for at least twenty-four months.47 The newspapers 
of the day were filled with stories of debtors bled dry for years 
and driven to desperate straits by the predations of the salary 
lenders.48 That’s why they were derided as loan sharks. 
B. British Moneylenders 
Low usury ceilings a hundred years ago helped spawn the 
first loan sharks. The low rates lenders were required to charge 
prevented the development of more responsible products in the 
legal market. But deregulation of interest rates in the market for 
consumer loans did not automatically put an end to loan-
sharking. Great Britain repealed its usury statute in 1854, 
initiating a bold experiment in deregulation.49 But the new class 
of moneylenders that multiplied during the next fifty years 
engaged in the same sorts of practices that were beginning to 
make the American salary lenders notorious near the turn of the 
century.  
Baker and Breitenstein recount the indictment of the British 
moneylending industry that was drawn up by reformers and a 
parliamentary commission in the last years of the nineteenth 
century,50 but they fail to note that these abuses abounded in a 
deregulated market for consumer credit. Rates were condemned 
as excessive, the lenders engaged in deceptive practices, harsh 
                                                                                                     
 47. See WASSAM, supra note 43, at 81. 
 48. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 37. 
 49. See DOROTHY ORCHARD & GEOFFREY MAY, MONEYLENDING IN GREAT 
BRITAIN 43 (1933). 
 50. See Baker & Breitenstein, supra note 2, at 584–85. 
820 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 807 (2012) 
collection methods were still employed, and many who borrowed 
became trapped by their debts.51 The commission found  
that in many cases default is inevitable, and that once a 
borrower has obtained a loan from a money-lender it is 
extremely difficult for him to get clear of the transaction. The 
circumstances are generally such as to force him to obtain 
renewal after renewal at increasingly extortionate rates until 
he is utterly ruined.52 
This is precisely what the Americans were beginning to call loan-
sharking in the 1890s, but it flourished in an essentially free 
market. The report concluded that “the system of money lending 
by professional money-lenders at high rates of interest is 
productive of crime, bankruptcy, unfair advantage over other 
creditors of the borrower, extortion from the borrower’s family 
and friends, and other serious injuries to the community.”53 
Indeed, the commissioners went so far as to claim “that only in 
rare cases is a person benefited by a loan obtained from a 
professional money-lender, and that the evil attendant upon the 
system far outweighs the good.”54 
In comparison to the American salary loan, the British 
promissory note seemed like a bargain. The typical rate was 5% a 
month, but the sums advanced were often larger and thus not 
exactly comparable to the American payday loan product of that 
period.55 Interest-rate deregulation may therefore have made 
small cash loans in Great Britain less expensive than in the 
United States, but deregulation did not do away with the debt 
trap that was the main loan-shark evil plaguing consumers. 
Rather than re-impose price controls, Parliament opted instead 
for information disclosure and judicial review of contracts in the 
Moneylenders Act of 1900. Creditors were required to register 
                                                                                                     
 51. See ORCHARD & MAY, supra note 49, at 43–76 (describing the abuses 
that flourished during the era of deregulation); see also THOMAS FARROW, IN THE 
MONEY-LENDER’S CLUTCHES (1895). 
 52. SELECT COMMITTEE ON MONEY-LENDING, REPORT, 1898, H.C., at iv 
(U.K). 
 53. Id. at v. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See ORCHARD & MAY, supra note 49, at 67 (“The usual rate on 
promissory notes, not too well secured, was 60 or 70 per cent a year . . . . 
Charges as high as 3,600 per cent were not unknown.”). 
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with the government and to desist from false advertising, while 
courts of equity were authorized to give relief when they deemed 
a transaction to be “harsh and unconscionable.”56 “But,” as 
Dorothy Orchard and Geoffrey May observed in their classic 
study, Moneylending in Great Britain, “business practice is like a 
gyroscope; to change its direction a considerable force must be 
applied. The act of 1900 did not apply sufficient force to redirect 
the course of moneylending; its results were modifications of 
details and extremes only.”57 Shark-like practices persisted in the 
market for cash loans and had to be attacked a quarter century 
later by a new Moneylenders Act, which established the 
presumption that interest in excess of 48% a year was 
unconscionable.58 
Price deregulation in Great Britain did not prevent the 
emergence of loan-sharking in its nonviolent form at the end of 
the nineteenth century. That form of predatory lending thrived 
where the rate was low and where the rate ceiling had been 
removed. In both environments lenders prospered by trapping 
many of their customers. A better, more responsible loan product 
was not generated spontaneously in either market. It took 
philanthropic initiative and government action to fashion such a 
product in the United States after the turn of the twentieth 
century. The low ceilings in many American states were raised, 
but only to the point where experience demonstrated that this 
new and more consumer-friendly type of loan product could be 
vended profitably by authorized creditors. The result was a 
drastic reduction in the cost of credit for consumers and, 
simultaneously, a dwindling of the old loan-shark population. 
IV. Finding the Mean 
The invention of the Uniform Small Loan Law (USLL) was 
one of the great achievements of progressivism in the first 
                                                                                                     
 56. See id. at 76–80 (reproducing the text of the Money-Lenders Act of 
1900). 
 57. Id. at 81. 
 58. See id. at 115–35 (reproducing the text of the Moneylenders Act of 
1927). 
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decades of the twentieth century.59 This model law was drafted by 
representatives of the Russell Sage Foundation in cooperation 
with a fraction of chattel-mortgage lenders who were seeking to 
rehabilitate their industry by carving out a legal exception to the 
low usury caps for a new, responsible lending product.60 
Variations of the USLL were adopted by three-quarters of the 
state legislatures by the middle of the century.61 Baker and 
Breitenstein acknowledge that the USLL was “effective in 
eliminating the moneylenders” who had operated in defiance of 
the old usury statutes, yet they depict the model law as a 
misguided failure because violent loan sharks emerged in some 
jurisdictions after its provisions were put into effect.62 But this 
assessment is too harsh. The USLL was in fact the most 
successful regulatory strategy ever devised to minimize the two 
kinds of loan-sharking that have been the plague of payday since 
the birth of the credit society. In many states where this law was 
enacted the loan-shark debt trap that had once been so common 
all but disappeared by the middle of the twentieth century. 
A. The Anti-Loan Shark Act 
The story of the origin of the USLL has been told before,63 so 
my discussion will be brief. This piece of legislation was the 
product of trial and error by progressive reformers who had come 
to the realization that low usury caps were counterproductive. As 
the author of the USLL, Arthur Ham, explained, “drastic laws 
result, not in the discontinuance of the usurious loan business, 
but in driving it further into the dark. Any attempt to work 
unnecessary hardship on the lender, to compass him about with 
                                                                                                     
 59. See MAYER, supra note 5, at 46–47 (explaining why the USLL was “a 
textbook example of progressive public policy”). 
 60. See ROBINSON & NUGENT, supra note 9, at 113–17 (recounting how the 
USLL was drafted). 
 61. See F. B. Hubachek, Progress and Problems in Regulation of Consumer 
Credit, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 4, 8 (1954) (noting that there were “36 states 
now having effective or partially effective small loan laws”). 
 62. See Baker & Breitenstein, supra note 2, at 586. 
 63. See generally Elizabeth Anderson, Experts, Ideas, and Policy Change: 
the Russell Sage Foundation and Small Loan Reform, 1909–1941, in 37 THEORY 
& SOC’Y 271 (2008) (describing the history, origin, and effect of the USLL). 
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unreasonable restriction, has the inevitable result of forcing the 
borrower to pay a still higher charge for his loan.”64 Experience 
had demonstrated that a purely repressive strategy missed its 
mark. Consumers would continue to patronize the loan sharks 
until they were provided with a better alternative. Ham was able 
to convince a broad coalition of progressive forces that “the 
remedy appears to lie in attracting honest capital into the salary 
loan business on a reasonable money-making basis.”65 This was 
accomplished by devising a credit product that was more 
expensive than a bank loan but still reasonably priced and, most 
importantly, structured in such a way that debtors could retire 
the principal in installments spread over a number of paydays.66 
The first draft of the USLL, authored in 1916, carved out an 
exception to the existing state usury ceiling for cash loans of $300 
or less when vended by licensed dealers, subject to regulatory 
oversight, who were required to compute interest on the unpaid 
balance of the loan only and were not permitted to take interest 
in advance.67 The maximum permissible charge was 3.5% a 
month, or 42% a year, but because the debt was amortized, the 
effective cost was considerably less.68 A borrower who received 
$100 in cash and was given a year to retire the debt paid less 
than $24 in interest.69 In the early years of the new “personal 
finance industry” called into existence by the USLL, the debt was 
typically secured with a chattel mortgage on home furnishings, 
                                                                                                     
 64. ARTHUR HAM, REMEDIAL LOANS: A CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAM 4–5 (1912). 
 65. Id. at 11. 
 66. See M. R. Neifeld, Institutional Organization of Consumer Credit, 8 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 27 (1941) (explaining that because “[i]n the 
American statute, the rate is a monthly one and must be so expressed,” lenders 
must schedule repayment in monthly installments). 
 67. See DAVID GALLERT, WALTER HILBORN & GEOFFREY MAY, SMALL LOAN 
LEGISLATION 90–94 (1932) (reproducing the text of the first draft of the USLL). 
 68. See id. at 92 (explaining that principal on loans must not exceed $300, 
interest rates must not exceed 3½% per month and may not be compounded, nor 
may interest be applied to any portion of the loan that had already been paid). 
 69. See EVANS CLARK, FINANCING THE CONSUMER 117 (1930) (“Borrowers 
who are charged 3½% per month on a $100 installment repayment loan do not 
pay $42 on the $100, as they would if their notes were discounted at that rate in 
advance. They pay a total of $22.75 because they are charged each month only 
for the balance of the loan of which they still have the actual use.”). 
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but over time most lenders dispensed with this formality and 
converted these extensions of credit into signature loans.70 
In states like Illinois, where the existing usury cap was 7%,71 
the USLL raised the legal price creditors could charge for small-
cash loans by a factor of six. But, since the typical salary loan cost 
20% a month in interest, the USLL managed to cut the stated 
price of small loans by a factor of six.72 The effective savings were 
even greater, since the regulated loans had to be amortized and 
the penalty fees lenders could assess were limited. Cash loans 
cost one-tenth of what had been the going rate when the usury 
cap was low.73 Raising the permissible charge saved consumers 
enormously. Lower prices also reduced the likelihood that 
borrowers would become trapped by their debts. Regulators and 
lenders also took steps to ensure that households could not 
pyramid debts by borrowing from more than one authorized 
dealer at a time.74 
Over the next three decades the USLL went through seven 
drafts.75 Later versions closed loopholes through which new types 
of loan sharks, like the salary buyers, managed to slip for a 
time.76 Baker and Breitenstein claim that “interest rate caps were 
largely abandoned as a means of regulating consumer credit 
beginning in the 1930s . . . because of the pervasive loan shark 
problem in the United States,”77 but the opposite is true. In fact, a 
number of states in the 1930s experimented with reducing the 
                                                                                                     
 70. See Adele Rabino, The Small Loan Law and Its Application in Illinois 
64 (1942) (unpublished M.A. dissertation, Northwestern University) (noting the 
transformation from chattel-mortgage to signature loans in the personal finance 
industry) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 71. See FRANKLIN W. RYAN, USURY AND USURY LAWS 29 (1924) (charting the 
legal rates and lawful limits of interest in 1921). 
 72. See Mayer, supra note 5, at 114. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See WILLFORD KING, THE SMALL LOAN SITUATION IN NEW JERSEY 22 
(1929) (“[T]he loan companies make every effort to prevent one man from 
borrowing from several different companies at once.”). 
 75. See Hubachek, supra note 61, at 7 (“Seven drafts of the Foundation’s 
uniform bill were published, the last in 1942. The basic principles of the first 
draft were continued in all later drafts. Changes merely improved the law to 
meet changing conditions.”). 
 76. See ROBINSON & NUGENT, supra note 9, at 157–61. 
 77. Baker & Breitenstein, supra note 2, at 582. 
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statutory rate to save consumers even more money.78 No state 
deregulated consumer credit during this era of bank failures. 
Modest reductions in the price of credit proved feasible; 36% a 
year became the maximum charge in many places at this time.79 
But where the ceiling was lowered too much, loan-sharking in its 
antediluvian form resurfaced.80 It also continued unabated in the 
eighteen states that had not enacted some version of the USLL 
before World War Two. The Russell Sage Foundation estimated 
that there was about $100 million in unregulated lending 
occurring in the United States in 1937.81 More than three-fourths 
of it was concentrated in the states with low usury caps, even 
though these jurisdictions accounted for less than 30% of the total 
population.82  
B. The Extinction of a Predator 
By the middle of the twentieth century, when the personal 
finance industry had fully matured and salary buying had been 
completely stamped out in the regulated states, many experts 
attested that loan-sharking had been all but extirpated where the 
USLL was in effect.83 A 1954 symposium in Law and 
Contemporary Problems extolled the success of the model law: 
“This law has virtually eliminated the loan shark wherever it has 
been enacted in full. It has done so by permitting a regulated, 
commercial, competitive source of consumer loans to operate at 
much lower than the loan shark’s rates though substantially 
                                                                                                     
 78. See Rolf Nugent, Three Experiments in Small-Loan Interest Rates, 11 
HARV. BUS. REV. 35, 37–46 (1933) (discussing the impact of three states’ 
decisions to lower maximum small-loan interest rates, beginning in 1929 and 
continuing into the 1930s). 
 79. See ROBINSON & NUGENT, supra note 9, at 259–60. 
 80. See Nugent, supra note 78, at 42–46 (noting the growth of illegal 
lending in New Jersey and West Virginia after the rate cap for small loans was 
reduced).  
 81. See ROLF NUGENT, CONSUMER CREDIT AND ECONOMIC STABILITY 401 
(1939). 
 82. See id. at 390–402 (reporting estimates of illegal lending across the 
United States at the end of the 1930s). 
 83. See NATIONAL CONSUMER FINANCE ASSOCIATION, THE CONSUMER 
FINANCE INDUSTRY 6 (1962) (“The Uniform Small Loan Law eliminated the loan 
shark wherever it was enacted.”). 
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higher than ordinary usury limits.”84 The Legal Aid Society of 
Minneapolis was “pleased to report that no cases of usurious 
lending in the small loan field have come to the attention of this 
office in the past several years. Prior to the passage of the 
Uniform Small Loan Act in 1939 this office was constantly 
involved in defending victims of ‘loan shark’ lending at rates far 
in excess of the legal limits.”85 Nebraska’s Department of Banking 
reported that “The disturbing activity and influence of the loan 
shark is today at more than a low ebb in Nebraska. It is virtually 
non-existent. . . . This almost complete absence of loan sharks is 
the most important reason why the borrowers of Nebraska are 
receiving the good small loan service they deserve.”86 Searches of 
the local press in these states from that time period confirm that 
loan-sharking, once so common, had vanished everywhere except 
in the movie theaters, where George Raft’s 1952 mob thriller 
“Loan Shark” was a matinee favorite. 
It was not price deregulation that brought about the demise 
of the salary brokers and the salary buyers, those first payday 
lenders. The USLL was a price-control law. It capped the rate 
lenders could charge, but at a level that made responsible lending 
feasible. Price deregulation a hundred years ago would have been 
not only politically impossible, given the ancient prejudice 
against usury that was still powerful then, but also 
counterproductive as a way to fight debt trapping because the 
policy would have amounted to issuing a license to loan shark. 
Legalization might have made the salary loan somewhat cheaper, 
though price deregulation in today’s payday-loan market has not 
had that effect.87 But legalization of high rates would have done 
nothing to force the salary lenders to amortize their product and 
to prevent overborrowing. We know this is true because price 
deregulation in the payday-loan market today has never had 
                                                                                                     
 84. Hubachek, supra note 61, at 5. 
 85. See J.A.A. Burnquist, A Regulatory Small Loan Law Solves Loan Shark 
Problem, 19 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 29, 41 (1954) (quoting a letter from the Chief 
Counsel of the Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis). 
 86. Harold Johnson, Nebraska Has No Loan Shark Problem Today, 19 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 42, 53 (1954). 
 87. States that do not cap prices for payday loans record the highest fees 
per $100 borrowed. 
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those effects.88 It does not undercut loan-sharking but authorizes 
it. The experience of the USLL completely contradicts the loan-
shark thesis: what it teaches us is that unless interest rates in 
the small-loan market are capped at a moderate level, debt 
trapping will flourish. 
V. The Rise and Fall of Mob Payday Lending 
While conceding that the USLL eliminated the nonviolent 
loan sharks that had savaged America’s cities in the first half of 
the twentieth century, Baker and Breitenstein argue that this 
piece of legislation had perverse consequences because it 
“actually helped to create the American loan shark.”89 They apply 
this label to the type of illegal lender “who is usually tied to 
organized crime and who, in addition to using deceptive practices 
and charging high interest rates, uses violence or threats of 
violence as a means of collection.”90 Baker and Breitenstein claim 
that this violent type of loan shark is “uniquely American,”91 
hence the label, but this is certainly false. Violent, mob-connected 
lenders have also operated in recent decades in Great Britain,92 
Italy,93 and Japan.94 This breed of loan shark is not uniquely 
American, though it does not seem to be present in every 
                                                                                                     
 88. Some payday lenders have switched to expensive installment loans 
where prices have been capped, but in states without price caps the main 
product is the short-term single-payment loan. See Nathalie Martin, 1,000% 
Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and 
Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 568 (2009) (documenting “a general shift in the 
New Mexico small-loan marketplace from payday loans to a new product called 
the ‘installment loan’” after more stringent regulations were imposed). 
 89. Baker & Breitenstein, supra note 2, at 586. 
 90. Id. at 582. 
 91. Id. at 583. 
 92. See Alistair Macdonald & Jeanne Whalen, Loan Sharks Circle Credit-
Starved Consumers—Illicit Operators Feed on Desperate Borrowers Who Gorged 
During Debt Boom; a 2,437% Interest Rate in Britain, WALL ST. J., Sept. 1, 2009, 
at A13 (noting an increase in illegal loan sharks in Great Britain). 
 93. See Mary Jordan, As Italian Banks Tighten Lending, Desperate Firms 
Call on the Mafia, WASH. POST., Mar. 1, 2009, at A01 (detailing an increase in 
illegal Mafia lending amid the global financial crisis). 
 94. See DAVID KAPLAN & ALEC DUBRO, YAKUZA: JAPAN’S CRIMINAL 
UNDERWORLD 155–57 (2003) (describing an underground consumer credit 
market in Japan with “heavy gangster overtones”). 
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developed society. Some countries that impose interest-rate 
ceilings have had to contend with these predators but others have 
not.95 Removing the ceiling also does not guarantee that violent 
loan sharks won’t emerge. Great Britain is a case in point. 
Violent, mob-connected creditors only came to prominence there 
after interest rates were deregulated once again in 1974. More 
will be said about this case in a later Part of the Article.96 But the 
point I want to make here is that the relationship between 
interest-rate regulation and violent loan-sharking is complicated 
and cannot be reduced to a simple, elegant formula like the loan-
shark thesis. That thesis does not explain well the pattern of 
violent payday lending in the United States over the last century. 
A. Appearance and Reality 
Before examining those patterns, three facts about mob loan-
sharking should be borne in mind. First, it hasn’t been as violent 
in practice as the media has made it out to be. Experts agree that 
“most loan-shark transactions are amicably conducted with both 
parties being satisfied.”97 The client needs cash that the loan 
shark agrees to provide without asking a lot of questions. The 
price is high but nobody else would lend the debtor money, so the 
exchange is mutually advantageous. The debtor is motivated to 
pay not only because his body is pledged as collateral but also 
because he wants to preserve his only line of credit.98 The 
creditor, in turn, wants to avoid the expense of hiring a 
“nutcracker” to collect the debt. As a 1960s Chicago “juice man” 
explained, the cost of hiring a thug to break a deadbeat’s leg 
                                                                                                     
 95. See NEW ECONOMICS FOUNDATION, DOORSTEP ROBBERY: WHY THE UK 
NEEDS A FAIR LENDING LAW 21 (2009) (“The Institut für Finanzdienstleistungen 
(IFF, Institute for financial services) recently, in a submission to the Office of 
Fair Trading, highlighted the lack of evidence on loan sharks in Germany. In 
addition, extensive internet and literature research did not reveal evidence of 
illegal lending in Germany and France.”). 
 96. See infra Part VII.B (providing examples from states with deregulated 
interest rates). 
 97. Loan-Sharking, supra note 33, at 97. 
 98. See REUTER & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 32, at 183 (“Persons who have 
needed to borrow from a loanshark are . . . likely to wish to borrow from him 
again . . . . [M]aintenance of the relationship which a borrower has established 
with a loanshark is an important consideration for the borrower.”). 
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might exceed the sum he owed and, with a broken leg, it would be 
hard for the debtor to earn money and catch up on his payments. 
Imposing a less debilitating penalty usually made more sense: 
“[A] finger deliberately slit open with a razor blade never kept 
anybody from working, and serves as a constant reminder of next 
payday.”99 But the best strategy, this loan shark insisted, was to 
select customers carefully and not load them with excessive debt: 
“When business is good in a smoothly-run operation, muscle is 
seldom needed for collections.”100 One of the few empirical studies 
of a mob loan-shark operation confirms this view. Based on FBI 
case files, the study reported that interviews with 115 customers 
of the loan business turned up only one debtor who had been 
threatened. None were beaten.101 Perhaps mob lenders in this 
particular city were unusually placid, but it would not be 
surprising if the use of force was rare. It would not take many 
examples to teach the lesson to debtors, and excessive use of force 
would only scare off business. The economics of violence in the 
loan-shark market tends to diminish the resort to corporal or 
capital punishment. 
Second, while expensive, the fees charged by mob lenders 
were often no more—and sometimes even less—than the fees 
charged by today’s payday lenders in the deregulated states. John 
Seidl says the standard rate in the 1960s was 20% a week,102 
which is more than payday lenders charge now. But he also gives 
examples of small loans to working people with annual interest 
rates below 200%, which is cheap for a payday loan.103 The 
Chicago “juice man” cited above said he charged 10% a week for a 
$100 cash advance, which is a little less than the going rate for 
payday loans today in states that do not cap the fees.104 The study 
based on FBI case files also reported surprisingly low rates. The 
                                                                                                     
 99. The Confessions of a 6-For-5 “Juice Man,” supra note 34, at 41. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See ANNELISE ANDERSON, THE BUSINESS  OF ORGANIZED CRIME 66 (1979) 
(finding that “[t]he use of force by members of the Benguena family to encourage 
payment is almost nonexistent”). 
 102. JOHN MICHAEL SEIDL, “UPON THE HIP”—A STUDY OF THE CRIMINAL LOAN-
SHARK INDUSTRY 40 (1968). 
 103. See id. at 41, 78, 100–01.  
 104. See The Confessions of a 6-For-5 “Juice Man,” supra note 34, at 40 (“If 
you borrow $100, your interest by next payday would only be $10.”). 
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typical charge was 20% spread over 10 or 12 weeks; the annual 
percentage rate for this product was about 150%.105 Payday loans 
today are never that inexpensive. 
Third, and most important, we must bear in mind that most 
mob loan-sharking in this country has neither catered to working 
people in search of emergency cash nor operated as payday credit 
in the way that salary lending did early in the twentieth century. 
The target populations of extortionate lenders have typically been 
gamblers, small businessmen, and fellow criminals in need of 
emergency financing.106 There has been some mob payday 
lending, too, but it died out long ago and has not been revived in 
states that restrict or prohibit payday lending now.107 Awful 
though it may be, we must bear in mind that most criminal loan-
sharking in the United States has operated in a different market 
from that of high-priced consumer credit. The one product does 
not substitute for the other, at least not in the twenty-first 
century. Hence regulatory changes in one market, bridge loans 
for working people, do not stimulate or constrict operations in the 
other market, which caters to a fundamentally different clientele. 
B. Scope and Development 
Bearing these facts in mind, let us return to the loan-shark 
thesis. It says that interest-rate caps breed violent loan sharks. 
The USLL is cited as a case in point. But if, as Baker and 
Breitenstein maintain, responsibility for the rise of mob loan-
sharking is to be ascribed to the USLL, two patterns must be 
explained: first, why this new sort of loan shark emerged only in 
certain jurisdictions where interest rates were capped but not in 
others; and second, in the jurisdictions where it did emerge, why 
mob loan-sharking appeared only long after the law was changed. 
Regarding the first question, the evidence is clear that mob 
loan-sharking has occurred only in certain geographical areas 
and not wherever interest rates are capped or criminal penalties 
imposed for usurious lending. Like the nonviolent type of loan-
                                                                                                     
 105. ANDERSON, supra note 101, at 65. 
 106. Id. at 66–67. 
 107. See infra Part V.B. 
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sharking, it is an urban phenomenon, but the scope of mob 
lending has always been more restricted. Traces of it are to be 
found only in the vicinity of the largest metropolitan areas—big 
cities like New York, Boston, Philadelphia, or Chicago. These are 
the places where crime families have been organized, but outside 
their relatively narrow territories mob loan-sharking seems never 
to have gained a foothold in this country. In an important study 
of criminal loan-sharking carried out in the late 1960s, Seidl tried 
to gauge the extent of its reach by traveling across New England 
and making inquiries about illegal lending at police stations, 
bars, and factories.108 He found no evidence of underworld credit 
networks outside the biggest cities.109 There were bookies in the 
smaller towns but no loan sharks, not even where there were 
large concentrations of factory workers.110 Mob lending could only 
establish itself in the largest markets, where it was possible to 
escape detection by the authorities.111 Other studies confirm the 
same point, that the imposition of interest-rate caps or the 
criminalization of illegal lending does not automatically spawn 
violent loan sharks. When Maine tightened restrictions on 
lending in 1967, many licensed lenders were forced out of 
business, but the author of a study critical of this policy conceded 
that “no evidence of loan sharking was found” after the limits 
were imposed.112 The mob did not suddenly fill the vacuum left by 
the retreat of the small-loan companies in states lacking the 
megalopolises that offer protective cover to these criminal 
organizations. 
Violent loan-sharking, then, is not inevitably called into 
existence wherever rate caps are imposed. And where it did come 
into existence in states that enacted a version of the USLL, the 
lag in time is considerable. There is agreement that mob loan-
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sharking emerged first in the boroughs of New York.113 Organized 
rings only began to operate in the 1930s, after the repeal of 
Prohibition.114 But the New York state legislature had raised the 
cap for small loans twenty years earlier.115 This is a lengthy 
delay, and it is even greater in the other states where mob 
lending took root. Illinois, for example, pushed through its 
version of the Anti-Loan Shark Act in 1917, yet there are no 
traces of syndicate loan-sharking to be found in Chicago until 
after World War Two.116 More than a quarter century separates 
the enactment of the Illinois law and the rise of “juice” lending, as 
it came to be known in Chicago.117 We cannot say, then, that 
criminal prohibition of high-rate lending and the emergence of 
mob loan-sharking are like cause and effect. Because there is 
considerable variance across time and space in the incidence of 
this type of violent payday lending, circumstantial factors not 
accounted for by the loan-shark thesis seem crucial.  
C. Evolution and Decay 
As Seidl notes, “criminal loan-sharking developed first as a 
small-loan business.”118 It was a form of payday lending but 
distinctive because its debt collectors were willing to lay their 
hands on customers who fell behind in their payments. For fifteen 
or twenty years this model of payday lending was largely 
concentrated within the boundaries of New York.119 It seems to 
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have sprouted in Chicago and other big cities during the 1950s 
but only came to the attention of the media in the next decade. 
Many sensational stories were written about the violence of “juice 
racketeers,” reshaping the popular image of what a loan shark 
is.120 But even as the public was becoming aware of this new type 
of loan-sharking, and at the same time forgetting that another 
type had once existed in the days before the USLL, mob lending 
was transforming itself. By the end of the decade informed 
observers began to note that, “while the prime victims of the loan 
sharks were formerly selected from impoverished wage earners, 
the prey is now found in the middle classes.”121 Businessmen and 
professionals had become the preferred clientele for syndicate 
loan sharks because they had collateral to seize in case of default 
and because a few larger loans were easier to service, less risky, 
and more lucrative than many tiny payday loans.122 Another 
observer at this time claimed that the $6-for-$5 factory 
operations of yesteryear were now “an anachronism bearing 
virtually no relation to current reality” in the black-market world 
of loan-sharking.123 Later still, an FBI official in New York would 
insist that “organized crime in this region has grown from the 
traditional concept of giving small loans to poor slobs who are 
beaten up by the system and need a few hundred bucks to a 
corporate level of substantial loans to businessmen.”124 In this 
respect, the mob loan sharks were merely imitating the behavior 
of the personal finance companies, which were increasingly 
abandoning the payday-loan business they had been established 
to provide because it was less profitable than selling second 
mortgages.125 Both sorts of lenders, legal and illegal, moved up 
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the income scale in search of a more lucrative and less 
troublesome clientele. 
One New York loan shark explained why he no longer 
worked the waterfront districts that had once teemed with mob 
payday lenders: “I wouldn’t put out any money even at 15 per 
cent [a week] now because operating costs are so high. Half the 
guys who borrow are on dope and no matter what you do, they 
aren’t going to pay you back because they end up on Rikers Island 
[in jail] or getting shot by the cops.”126 Even a juice man couldn’t 
squeeze blood from a turnip. His money was now invested with a 
brokerage firm, he said, “because even if it ain’t sure, you don’t 
have all those creeps and bums to work with.”127 
Baker and Breitenstein claim that “the American [or mob] 
loan shark problem remained severe until the late 1970s,” when 
interest rates began to be deregulated.128 The landmark Supreme 
Court decision was Marquette National Bank v. First Omaha 
Service Corp., which authorized national banks to export 
whatever interest rate was operative in the state where they 
were chartered.129 “Because this final deregulation of interest 
rates,” Baker and Breitenstein say, “included nearly every 
potential borrower in the market for legal lending, the American 
loan shark, whose collection practices were unappealing to 
borrowers, was run out of business.”130 This fits the script of the 
loan-shark thesis but it does not accord with the facts on the 
ground. Mob payday lending had withered well before interest 
rates were deregulated by the federal and state governments at 
the end of the 1970s.131 The juice men were not run out of 
business by new, high-priced forms of credit like the postdated 
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check loans that were beginning to emerge in the 1980s. They 
had already quit the field of their own accord. The mob loan-
sharking that endured into the era of deregulation targeted 
different populations and did not compete directly with the new 
payday loans. It has been decades since anyone has had to worry 
about underworld affiliates working the local factories and 
trapping blue-collar family men with expensive $100 debts. 
Even before its demise, it is doubtful that the problem of mob 
payday lending could have been classified as “severe.” Certainly it 
never reached anything like the scale of nonviolent loan-sharking 
that flourished early in the twentieth century. In the urban 
centers for which FBI case files were made available, the 
estimate is that criminal loan sharks provided 0.1% of all 
consumer credit in the city, or 43¢ per person.132 Because working 
people in need of emergency cash constituted but one fraction of 
the underworld lender’s clientele, it seems more accurate to 
describe the problem of mob payday lending as minor, even 
insignificant, but not severe. 
Mob payday lending does belong to the era of the USLL, but 
it is too great a simplification of the historical record to say that it 
was caused in any direct way by that piece of legislation. The 
story is more complicated. It is also inaccurate to say that 
deregulation killed off the violent loan sharks, because that 
population dwindled before interest rates were deregulated. What 
is more, as I shall demonstrate below, black-market lending—
even of the violent sort—has endured where interest-rate caps 
have been lifted. At the same time, deregulation has permitted 
the older type of nonviolent loan sharks to reemerge in a new 
form—as today’s payday lenders. 
VI. The Return of the Loan Sharks 
Baker and Breitenstein fear that if interest rates are capped 
once again, the loan sharks will return. But what they do not see 
is that the loan sharks in the original sense of the epithet have 
already reappeared in large numbers, precisely because interest 
rates were uncapped. Financial deregulation in the 1980s revived 
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the business of high-priced, short-term lending that the USLL 
had largely quashed. Today’s payday lenders are the newest 
breed of loan shark. 
A. The Evolution of Payday Lending 
The main difference between the salary loan of a hundred 
years ago and today’s payday advance is the instrument of 
security that binds the debtor to the creditor. Salary loans were 
typically secured with a wage assignment, which entitled the 
creditor to collect the payment due from the payroll office where 
the debtor worked.133 While payday lenders now sometimes take 
wage assignments too, their main instrument of security is the 
postdated check debtors leave when they collect their cash. That 
check is held in pawn and then redeemed on the borrower’s next 
payday, unless the debt is renewed.134 Postdated-check lending 
dates back to the 1930s but only became a big business during 
the era of financial deregulation.135 It is an offshoot of the check-
cashing industry and could only develop on a large scale when 
checking accounts had proliferated into the bottom half of the 
income scale.136 In some jurisdictions interest rates were 
deregulated before the new product appeared on the scene, but in 
others the established check cashers began to vend the product 
first and only later sought legislative exemption from the existing 
usury statutes, when the courts determined that the transaction 
counted as an extension of credit.137 Eventually, forty-one states 
accorded legal recognition to these new, high-priced loans, but a 
cluster of states along the eastern seaboard retained their 
traditional usury caps and thus blocked the development of a 
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legal market in payday loans. Over the past decade a backlash 
has grown against the product, and some states have rescinded 
the authorization they once granted to this industry. Today, 
payday lending is feasible and permitted in thirty-four states.138 
Interest-rate deregulation was one of the preconditions for 
the rise of payday lending, but just as important was the 
deregulation of banking that began at the end of the 1970s.139 
New subprime credit products were developed, more credit was 
extended further down the income scale, and banks began to 
impose heavier penalties for bouncing checks and overdrawing 
accounts. The new fees—combined with greater indebtedness, 
decreased savings, and accelerating income inequality—stoked 
the demand for the short bursts of liquidity that check lenders 
began offering to subprime consumers at a premium price. 
Payday lending grew in part as a way to avoid incurring the 
expensive charges banks imposed when checking accounts ran 
dry before they could be replenished from the income stream of 
cash-strapped consumers. 
In the space of twenty-five years, payday lending grew from 
nothing into a $50 billion business.140 The fees the check lenders 
charge today in the most deregulated jurisdictions are double the 
rate of the old salary lenders and often more than the mob 
payday lenders assessed. In states like Wisconsin, which does not 
cap fees, the typical two-week, $300 loan costs $66.141 Stated as 
an annual percentage rate, the cost is 573%. 
B. The Debt Trap 
Many people would classify a loan that expensive as loan-
sharking. But, as I argued in a previous section of this paper, the 
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real measure of loan-sharking isn’t the annual percentage rate 
lenders charge, but the length of time expensive debt endures.142 
Loan-sharking is debt trapping; it is a predatory practice that 
consists in renewing short-term loans again and again in order to 
maximize fee income. This is what the salary lenders and the 
juice men both did. They structured their extensions of credit in 
such a way that ostensibly short-term loans became expensive 
long-term debts. 
If we make debt duration the measure of loan-sharking, 
rather than the application of violence to collect the debt, then 
today’s payday lending is loan-sharking. Only a small minority of 
payday loan customers borrow for two weeks and then quit or 
take out just a few loans dispersed over the course of a calendar 
year.143 A recent report by the Center for Responsible Lending 
offers telling evidence. Based on regulatory data gathered in 
Oklahoma, the study reveals that payday borrowers “are indebted 
an average of 212 days in the first year they borrow (or 58 
percent of the year), and continue to be indebted over half the 
time in their second year as well.”144 This average includes the 
15% of customers who borrow once and never go back to the 
payday lender. The report notes that, “if we leave out these one-
time borrowers, we estimate that the remaining 85 percent of 
borrowers are indebted for [an average of] 345 days (63 percent of 
the total time period) in their first 18 months and 432 days (59 
percent of the total time period) on average over the course of two 
years.”145 What is more, the data “demonstrate that borrowers 
tend to become more heavily indebted—taking out loans more 
frequently and for larger amounts—as they continue to borrow 
from payday lenders.”146 These are exactly the sorts of patterns 
that earned the salary lenders the loan shark epithet a hundred 
years ago. 
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The results of this study are entirely representative. The 
payday lenders’ national organization cautions consumers that 
“payday advances should be used for short-term financial needs 
only, not as a long-term financial solution.”147 But in every 
jurisdiction where regulatory data are reported on the pattern of 
consumer use, trends like those revealed in Oklahoma recur.148 
These short-term loans become, in the majority of cases, long-
term and very expensive debts. The product forms a trap, clever 
because it does not ensnare every consumer and because the 
result is achieved without the use of fraud or violence. If we judge 
matters by the public outcry, payday lending is the shrewdest 
form of loan-sharking yet devised. 
C. The Scale of Payday Lending 
Measured by the fraction of the population that makes use of 
the product, payday lending has not reached the scale of salary 
lending a hundred years ago and it is unlikely ever to do so. The 
consumer credit market has expanded enormously over the past 
century and it is now thickly populated with many different kinds 
of products. Many wage earners who might have patronized the 
salary lenders at the start of the twentieth century can now 
charge purchases on a bank card and pay the bill later or get a 
cash advance with a credit card. Both options will be much 
cheaper than a payday loan, unless late penalties are incurred.149 
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Estimates of the percentage of the population that has secured a 
payday advance are imprecise. According to the 2007 Survey of 
Consumer Finances, 2.4% of households reported getting a 
payday advance during the preceding twelve months.150 But self-
reporting surveys probably underestimate significantly the size of 
the market because a taint attaches itself to the product. The 
latest regulatory report on payday lending in Florida stated that 
about 750,000 individuals had secured at least one payday loan 
during the previous twelve months, which works out to be 5% of 
the adult population in the state and as many as one in ten 
households.151 Two million adults (or one in seven) have secured a 
payday advance in Florida over the past decade, according to 
state records,152 but only an estimated 303,000 residents 
admitted doing so in a comprehensive survey carried out by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in 2009.153 But whether 
the higher or lower estimates are more accurate, it seems clear 
that loan-sharking of the nonviolent sort does not engulf as large 
a share of the population today as it did in the heyday of salary 
lending. 
There is proportionately less salary debt trapping now than 
there once was in the earliest phases of the credit society, but in 
contrast to the past, the great bulk of this debt trapping is legal. 
The market now is white, not gray or black. Loan-sharking in its 
original sense has been licensed, in part due to the misguided 
fear that prohibition of high-rate lending will revive the mob loan 
sharks that continue to haunt the modern imagination. In the 
next Part of the Article, I explain why this fear is misplaced and 
what forms black-market lending now takes in the twenty-first 
century. 
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VII. Illegal Lending Today 
According to Baker and Breitenstein, “[i]t is very likely that 
elimination of the other alternative sources of credit which are 
the main competition for the American loan shark would result in 
his return.”154 If the interest rates lenders may charge are capped 
so low that payday lending and other forms of expensive 
subprime credit disappear, violent loan-sharking will be revived, 
they claim. But there is no need to speculate about whether low 
usury caps would have this effect. Payday lending is infeasible or 
prohibited today in sixteen states plus the District of Columbia.155 
If the loan-shark thesis is valid, extortionate payday lending 
ought to flourish where prohibition is enforced and should not 
exist where interest rates have been deregulated. But the 
evidence suggests that neither of these propositions is correct. 
A. Where Prohibition Is in Effect 
With a maximum permissible interest rate of 18% a year, 
Vermont has one of the lowest usury caps in the nation.156 Payday 
lending has never been authorized there, yet no federal 
indictments have been recorded in the state during the last 
twenty years for engaging in an extortionate credit transaction, 
and the local press has not published a single story in that time 
about local black-market lending.157 If the loan-shark thesis were 
valid, violent loan-sharking ought to be rampant in Vermont, but 
there is no evidence that it is. The usury cap in Maine is 30% a 
year,158 but no federal prosecutions for extortionate lending have 
been initiated during the twenty-first century. One such case was 
processed during the 1990s, but it concerned a botched drug deal, 
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not a loan-sharking operation.159 The local press has also failed to 
register any reports about criminal gangs engaged in illegal 
lending over the past two decades. Maryland is another state that 
retained its version of the USLL but shows no evidence that loan-
shark rings have ever flourished there during the last quarter-
century.160 
Other states that prohibit expensive check loans have 
recorded more federal indictments for extortionate lending, in 
those jurisdictions where organized crime has long operated. 
Since the turn of the twenty-first century, four cases were 
initiated under Part 18:894 of the United States Code in 
Connecticut; seven in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania; 
seventeen in Massachusetts; seventeen in New Jersey; and 
seventy-one in the Southern District of New York.161 But where 
accounts of individual cases are available, it seems clear that 
none of the mob loan-sharking prosecuted by federal authorities 
could be classified as payday lending. The loans were too large 
and the interest rates too low to make these transactions 
comparable to the payday advance. The typical victims of these 
criminal loan sharks were gamblers and small businessmen, not 
single moms in search of emergency cash.  
Very rarely, reports surface in some of these states of vest-
pocket credit operations that more closely approximate payday 
lending. New York State’s Office of the Inspector General 
reported a case in 2009 of a state employee who had been making 
small loans for some years at usurious rates to coworkers.162 A 
$30 cash advance cost $40 two weeks later, which translates into 
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an annual percentage rate of 865%.163 Other loans cost less or 
were for considerably larger sums, and, like many independent 
operators, this black-market lender never threatened debtors 
with physical harm.164 Over the space of a decade he extended 
approximately $13,000 in credit.165 The man was an old-fashioned 
loan shark, but it is striking how rare his breed is in a state that 
caps interest rates so low. The Inspector General’s Office has 
issued scores and scores of press releases over the past five years 
detailing allegations of employee impropriety, but in that time 
period only one case of vest-pocket loan-sharking has come to 
light.166 No doubt some illegal lending is never detected, but if 
violent payday lending were rife, as the loan-shark thesis predicts 
it will be in states with low usury caps, more evidence of its 
occurrence ought to surface because loan-sharking—especially 
violent loan-sharking—makes for good headlines. 
B. Where Deregulation Is in Effect 
The loan-shark thesis is wrong in both its predictions: states 
with low rate caps have experienced little or no violent loan-
sharking in recent years, while at least some states with high or 
no rate caps have failed to exterminate this form of predation. 
Illinois is one example. It deregulated interest rates in 1982, but 
federal prosecution of extortionate credit transactions still occurs. 
In the 1990s, nineteen cases were prosecuted and since 2000, 
when efforts to regulate payday lending began, another six cases 
were initiated.167 As is true elsewhere, none of these cases 
involved what could be called payday lending, which the juice 
crews gave up long ago. In slum areas in Chicago, reports have 
surfaced of neighborhood loan sharks who extend credit to 
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“shopkeepers and residents who may not have bank accounts or 
access to lines of credit.”168 One sociologist counted seventeen 
loan sharks in the community where he did fieldwork back in the 
1990s, some employing violence to collect debts but others not.169 
Compared to a payday loan, the rates being charged seemed like 
a bargain: 20%–30% spread over several weeks or months. This 
black-market business persisted even though licensed lenders 
could charge any rate they liked in the legal market. Rate caps 
cannot explain the phenomenon because they had been removed. 
The case of Great Britain also exposes the fallacy of the loan-
shark thesis. Violent loan-sharking existed there in rough 
neighborhoods before it made its appearance in the United States 
and it occurred both before interest rates were restricted in 1927 
and after.170 Interest rates were deregulated once again in 1974, 
but the problem of violent loan-sharking has become more 
prominent since that time.171 It occurs mostly in depressed areas 
among the unemployed, who rely on public assistance. The illegal 
lender takes the debtor’s benefit book as collateral for the cash 
advance but may also use violence to compel repayment.172 A 
survey of low-income households in Great Britain reported that 
3% had turned to illegal lenders for credit, which works out to be 
0.44% of the total British population.173 The problem could not be 
described as severe, although the press regularly reports 
harrowing anecdotes, but the key point is that violent loan-
sharking occurs in Great Britain even though interest rates are 
not capped. Deregulation does not automatically exterminate this 
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breed because not even a payday lender unencumbered by rate 
caps will extend credit to everyone who walks through the door. 
Some types of debtors are too risky to lend to unless you can 
extort repayment from them, which means that even the freest 
market will not be able to kill off every loan shark. 
C. In Cyberspace 
The loan-shark thesis is too simple, I have shown, but it is 
also outdated. It does not take account of the way that 
technological change has remade the market for illegal loans. 
Today, somebody who is short of cash before payday and who 
cannot access legal credit will not go searching for a break-your-
leg loan shark in her neighborhood but will turn instead to the 
Internet, where unlicensed lending abounds.174 Cash can be 
deposited directly in a checking account and payments debited 
automatically, without debtor and creditor ever having to meet 
face to face. The charges are very high, typically $25–$30 dollars 
for every $100 borrowed, and, “in many cases, the default option 
is to pay the finance charge only and renew the loan for another 
payday. If a consumer does nothing, the loan is automatically 
flipped.”175 This is the purest sort of loan-sharking, understood as 
debt trapping, but no customer is ever beaten by an online 
payday lender. The unlicensed vendors often locate themselves in 
tribal jurisdictions that claim sovereign immunity from local 
regulations or offshore, beyond the reach of American laws.176 
They have developed aggressive methods of debt collection, 
sometimes falsely threatening debtors with arrest for bank 
fraud,177 but they cannot be classified as violent loan sharks even 
                                                                                                     
 174. See generally JEAN ANN FOX & ANNA PETRINI, CONSUMER FEDERATION OF 
AMERICA, INTERNET PAYDAY LENDING (2004) (outlining the advent of Internet 
payday lending and recommending increased regulation). 
 175. Id. at 4, 17. 
 176. See id. at 7–8 (citing examples of American companies that operate 
online out of Canada and the Federation of Saint Christopher and Nevis). 
 177. See Intelligence Note, Telephone Collection Scam Related to Delinquent 
Payday Loans, INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CENTER (Dec. 1, 2010), 
http://www.ic3.gov/media/2010/101201.aspx (last visited Apr. 3, 2012) (“[C]allers 
threaten victims with legal action, arrests, and in some cases physical violence if 
they refuse to pay.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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when their techniques are extortionate. They are a new mutation 
of the loan shark genus and constitute a bigger problem than the 
violent loan sharks that ceded the payday loan market long ago.  
There are no reliable figures on the volume of illegal Internet 
payday lending that is occurring today.178 Some states that 
impose lower rate caps and prohibit payday lending have 
aggressively pursued the unlicensed vendors,179 but this does not 
mean more of that type of loan-sharking is occurring in these 
states. Unlicensed lenders can trap consumers anywhere in 
cyberspace, regardless of whether payday lending is permitted in 
the borrower’s locale. Statistics reported by the Internet Crime 
Complaint Center for each state do not show any correlation with 
local usury laws.180 A news article on payday lending in Oregon 
reported that complaints against payday lenders increased after 
the usury rate was lowered to 36% a year, but the numbers cited 
were small.181 It stands to reason that Internet payday lending 
would be more frequent where the product is not available from 
bricks-and-mortar vendors, but only these cyber loan sharks 
know the actual numbers. Whatever the numbers may be, what 
must be appreciated is that unlicensed virtual payday lending is 
the new face of loan-sharking now. It is not violent and its appeal 
as a way to raise cash quickly and anonymously reduces still 
further the likelihood that violent loan-sharking will be revived 
where rate caps are imposed or reduced. The shape of black-
market credit has changed. Mob payday lending ought to be seen 
as a historical anomaly rather than an ever-present threat. There 
is no reason to think it will swell where price caps are imposed 
today. 
                                                                                                     
 178. See DENNIS TELZROW, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE PAYDAY ADVANCE 
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VIII. Conclusion: The Minimization of Loan-sharking 
If we define loan-sharking as it was originally understood, as 
expensive debt trapping, and if we recognize that some loan 
sharks are violent but others are not, then the American 
experience with payday lending over the past 150 years teaches 
us that the total quantity of loan-sharking has been reduced the 
most when interest-rate ceilings are pegged at a moderate level. 
The USLL, which capped the price of small loans in the vicinity of 
36% a year, was the most effective anti-loan-sharking measure 
ever adopted in this country. It raised the ceiling high enough for 
authorized lenders to market responsible credit products but not 
so high that it licensed the short-term, interest-only extensions of 
credit that have been the preferred method of debt trapping by 
every species of loan shark. Even if it is true that the USLL 
spawned a certain number of violent mob lenders in the biggest 
cities—a result, as we have seen, that did not occur automatically 
or everywhere—it must also be acknowledged that this law and 
the industry it regulated starved into extinction many more of the 
nonviolent but no less predatory salary lenders and salary buyers 
who were the pests of payday early in the twentieth century. 
Financial deregulation, by contrast, came on the scene after mob 
payday lending had vanished, and what it managed to accomplish 
was to call back into existence a loan-sharking industry that 
progressive reformers thought they had vanquished. 
Defenders of today’s payday lending industry correctly 
observe that other credit products exist now that are even more 
expensive than the postdated-check loan. When calculated as an 
annual percentage rate, the overdraft charges levied by banks 
can exceed 1000%.182 Such products could be construed as debt 
trapping too and more onerous than payday loans.183 Where 
payday advances are permitted, consumers have a lower cost and 
convenient alternative that can help them avoid the debt traps 
                                                                                                     
 182. See Owen Asplundh, Bounce Protection: Payday Lending in Sheep’s 
Clothing, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 349, 349–51 (2004) (noting that “[l]ike payday 
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(comparing payday loans to new bounce protection loans offered by banks). 
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laid by banks.184 Viewed from this angle, payday lending looks 
like a market-based solution to the most expensive forms of 
predatory lending. We fight loan sharks, too, the payday lenders 
might say, but we get no credit because the loan sharks we 
fight—the chartered banks—hide behind a cloak of respectability.  
Whether payday lending increases or decreases the demand 
for overdraft products is a disputed issue that I will not try to 
resolve here.185 But the point with which I will conclude is that 
this is the right way to frame the question about loan-sharking. 
The problem of loan-sharking is fundamentally the problem of 
debt trapping. It comes in different forms and the aim of public 
policy ought to be to minimize the total quantity of trapping that 
occurs. The goal should be to reduce the whole population of loan 
sharks and not just one breed. The violent sort of loan shark 
emphasized by what I have called the loan-shark thesis is the 
most exotic and dangerous species in this genus, but it is also the 
rarest. Whatever threat it may have represented decades ago, it 
has dwindled away and is unlikely to be revived in the altered 
environment of the twenty-first century. What we ought to be 
worried about is not the mob shark but all of the other debt 
trappers that have proliferated since our credit markets were 
deregulated. There are more of them now than ever before and 
most of them have been issued licenses. That is the loan-shark 
problem regulators should confront. 
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